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ABSTRACT
Due to the complex nature of mobile communication systems, most
of the security eorts in its domain are isolated and scaered across
underlying technologies. is has resulted in an obscure view of
the overall security. In this work, we aempt to x this problem
by proposing a domain-specic threat modeling framework. By
gleaning from a diverse and large body of security literature, we
systematically organize the aacks on mobile communications into
various tactics and techniques. Our framework is designed to model
adversarial behavior in terms of its aack phases and to be used as
a common taxonomy matrix. We also provide concrete examples
of using the framework for modeling the aacks individually and
comparing them with similar ones.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→ Security requirements; Mobile and wire-
less security; •Networks→ Mobile networks;
KEYWORDS
reat Modeling, Security framework, Mobile communication
1 INTRODUCTION
Reliance on mobile phones is continuously increasing for purposes
other than just making voice calls. More than half of the world
population now has a mobile subscription, and a vast majority of
it comprises mobile Internet users [88]. While the newer genera-
tion of mobile technologies (5G) is slowly paving its way, mobile
coverage that relies on previous generations (2G, 3G, and 4G) has
increased signicantly. It now leaves only 10% of the world popula-
tion outside the mobile networks coverage areas [87]. Furthermore,
mobile Internet is now aordable to the population from low and
middle-income countries [62], and it acts as the rst and only means
of Internet access. In short, we are moving towards fast, reliable,
and robust mobile connections. However, what is going at a snail
pace is the security of mobile communications. is is because es-
tablishing reliable and faster connections has always been the goal
of mobile communications rather than achieving secure communi-
cation. Security evolved in a closed environment where protocol
standardization eorts oen require an industry aliation and so-
ware components are proprietary. Up until recent years, network
security was achieved by restricting access only to a closed network
of trusted partners rather than using strong cryptographic building
blocks. Such practices have resulted in a lack of open source mod-
ules, tools to conduct audits, datasets about vulnerabilities, and,
most importantly, lack of public knowledge. On the contrary, due
to the gradual replacement of telephony protocols with IP-based
protocols, which evolved in a more open setup, security tools avail-
able in the public domain for the laer are now used by hackers to
exploit the mobile networks [9].
Despite the odds, mobile communication systems have under-
gone a fair amount of scrutiny from the security research com-
munity. For example, internal components of a mobile device [71,
74, 101], radio communication between the phone and the cell
towers[37, 162], and mobile core network protocols [55, 80, 122]
have been tested for security-critical issues. All these isolated
research eorts are scaered across underlying protocols and tech-
nologies, and, it has resulted in an obscure and complex view of mo-
bile communication security. While some works have systematized
and connected the isolated knowledge, e.g., telephony frauds [154],
mobile device privacy [167], and authentication schemes [60], they
still look at one specic problem or subsystem. Only a handful of
research has taken holistic security into consideration [150]. We
extend this specic line of research of looking at mobile communi-
cation threats as a whole rather than in separate parts.
Despite its age and plethora of oensive security literature avail-
able, mobile communications do not have a domain-specic threat
modeling framework. reat landscape studies and best practice
guidelines by standardization and other governance bodies [25, 63]
may use generic threat models, we argue that it is not sucient.
Also, the aacks are communicated mainly in the form of message
sequence charts; while they are useful to communicate about a
single aack in detail, they do not provide much insight on captur-
ing adversarial behavior that is usually multi-parted. In this work,
we x these shortcomings by proposing a domain-specic threat
modeling framework that is built on the existing aacks literature
and can be used in parallel with the ongoing development of 5G
technology. We believe that our framework initiates a conversa-
tion towards unifying prior knowledge and future eorts to secure
mobile communication networks.
Contributions— Our contributions from this work are as follows.
We provide a comprehensive overview of dierent subsystems of
mobile communications and identify various potential threat actors.
Based on a systematic methodology, we present the “Bhadra frame-
work” that models the threats to mobile communication systems. In
this framework, we categorize publicly known aacks into 8 tactical
categories and 47 techniques in total. We organize them further in
terms of various phases of the aack life cycle, namely, mounting,
execution and results. We also show in detail, with concrete use
cases, how to use our framework to capture adversarial behavior
by modeling the aacks individually and to compare with similar
ones. We also discuss the future directions in which our work can
ourish with the help of the mobile communications security com-
munity. Our framework is agnostic to underlying technologies and
aligned with MITRE ATT&CK, a popular framework for modeling
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enterprise IP systems [168]. Given that 5G networks involve drastic
transitions from mobile-specic technologies to IP-specic ones,
we believe that the alignment of frameworks makes it easier in
terms of future eorts.
Structure— In Section 2, we describe our motivation for this work.
We then give a high-level overview of mobile network topology,
including various subsystems and potential adversaries in Section 3.
In Section 4, we introduce the Bhadra framework, including the
methodology that we followed to categorize adversarial tactics and
techniques. We discuss them further in detail in terms of aack
mounting, execution and results in Sections 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
We provide concrete use cases of our models in Section 8. We
discuss the future directions and limitations of our work in Section 9.
Finally, we conclude the paper with closing remarks in Section 10.
2 MOTIVATION
reat modeling is an essential process in system designs to inte-
grate security and to identify critical aspects of the system that
needs to be protected. It is an iterative process that involves den-
ing security requirements as well as identifying and mitigating
threats to reduce potential security risks systematically. ere are
various generic threat modeling frameworks [164] (e.g., STRIDE,
DREAD and PASTA), each with its own advantages and disadvan-
tages [34, 160]. When applying such generic models to a specic
domain, it requires careful adaptation or combination with other
threat models. For instance, STRIDE is intended for analyzing so-
ware vulnerabilities, with access to the source code; however, it is
oen used for modeling threats, with customization, to distributed
systems. Adapting other generic frameworks becomes unmanage-
able as a system grows mature and complicated. It requires its own
threat modeling framework with domain-specic taxonomy and
threats. We can nd examples of such dedicated threat models, for
example, in the domain of storage systems [76] or industrial control
systems [159].
Despite its age and the growing number of threats, there are
very few threat modeling frameworks explicitly dedicated to mo-
bile communication systems. e systematization of knowledge
(SoK) genre of academic literature about mobile communication as
a whole [150] or as subsystems [60, 150, 154, 167] points us to the
growing needs of the community for a dedicated threat modeling
framework. However, to our best knowledge, thesis by Kotap-
ati [103], which dates back to 2008, is one of the very few works
that has aempted to dene a threat model for GSM networks.
Although the GSM network is still in use today, it co-exists with
higher generations of mobile communications and with various
components and features that did not exist in 2008. Nonetheless,
our primary motivation is to extend domain-specic threat mod-
eling for mobile communication systems, that is agnostic to the
underlying technologies, and can be used to model the threats from
all possible aack surfaces that are part of the newer generations.
Our other motivation comes from the requirements of a large
mobile network provider company. e company comprises a wide
range of employees: engineers who build end-to-end mobile com-
munication systems, technical sales and marketing executives who
sell the products and services to mobile operators, researchers who
contribute to both existing and future solutions, standardization
experts who exchange knowledge by participating in standards
commiees, and other technical support personals who assist cus-
tomers with xing technical issues. ey share equal responsibili-
ties for securing mobile communication systems altogether. Despite
having in-depth technical knowledge required for their respective
roles, the main problem they currently face is the lack of a common
taxonomy and metrics to capture a high-level overview of the state
of security of the entire system. e company uses the MITRE
ATT&CK threat modeling framework [168, 169] on the enterprise
management side, and they believe a dedicated framework for mo-
bile communication systems that can co-exist with ATT&CK will
be useful.
Due to the complex nature of the mobile communication systems,
we also believe that the lack of a common taxonomy to commu-
nicate security-related issues is a generic problem amongst most
of the companies working in this sector. ese companies heavily
rely on the resources produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) in the form of normative technical specications (TS)
and informative technical reports (TR). For example, series 33 [1]
and 35 [2] provide in-depth knowledge of individual subsystems, in
terms of how the underlying technology can be built securely. Other
regulatory bodies such as the GSM Association (GSMA) [4] and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [45] also
produce security studies and guidelines that complements 3GPP’s
eorts. ey also produce resources that discuss the summary of
aacks on mobile communication systems [25, 63, 65]. Although all
these resources provide a common taxonomy and aack categoriza-
tion of some sort to the companies in the mobile communication
sector, they unfortunately cannot replace traditional threat models.
Furthermore, both the technical specications and aack liter-
ature use message sequence charts (also known as sequence dia-
grams) as a standard form of communicating the working mecha-
nisms and related vulnerabilities. Given the protocol-heavy nature
of the mobile communication systems, such message sequence
charts provide a clear understanding of how protocol messages
between dierent network entities work or can be exploited. How-
ever, they fail to capture the multi-parted adversarial behavior of an
aack or to provide any further insights than can be derived while
studying multiple aacks of similar kinds. We believe that this can
also be xed with an appropriate format of the threat model.
To this end, our goal is a design a domain-specic framework
that provides a common taxonomy and categorization of aacks
and retains the usefulness of message sequence charts but in a
more insightful manner. Our goal is also to ensure that the threat
model is simple and easy to be used by dierent technical roles of
a company.
3 BACKGROUND
Signicant changes in the nature of technology and architecture in
mobile communication networks are collectively referred by their
standardized “generation (G)”. Each generation is expected to over-
come the limitations of their previous generations with improved
network capabilities (e.g., speed, frequency, data capacity, security,
and latency) and with new techniques and features. e rst gener-
ation (1G) used analog network signals, which could support only
voice calls. Digital signals are used from the second generation
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Figure 1: Overview of mobile networks topology
(2G) or Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) onward,
which introduced Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia
Messaging Service (MMS), the laer although being laggy and of-
ten without success. Intermediate generations such as the General
Packet Radio Service (GPRS or 2.5G) and Enhanced Data rates for
GSM (EDGE or 2.75G) improvised network capabilities to enable
stable internet connections, especially when the user is on the
move. Both 1G and 2G use circuit switching connection-oriented
networks, with a dedicated route between the source and desti-
nation until the entire message is transferred through it, for both
voice and data transfers. In the third generation (3G) or Univer-
sal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), connection-less
packet switching networks improved speed and reliability for trans-
mission of larger amounts of data. With that, mobile users could
make video calls, stream media, and play online games from their
3G enabled mobile phones. e fourth-generation (4G) or Long
Term Evolution (LTE) increased the bandwidth and lowered latency
of mobile Internet connection, which contributed largely to the
growth of mobile broadband with a high quality of streaming (e.g.,
less buering than 3G connections). Both voice (through Voice over
LTE) and data are transmied through IP-based packet switching
networks in 4G. We recommend that the readers refer to the work
of Rost et al. [148] for more details about the evolution of mobile
network architecture.
3.1 Mobile networks topology
We now present a high-level overview of modern mobile network
topology (refer to Figure 1) and describe functionalities of the associ-
ated components. is serves as the technical background required
for the rest of the paper. Please note that we mainly focus on the
generations of mobile communication that currently co-exists with
each other at the time of writing this paper, i.e., 2G, 3G, and 4G
only.
3.1.1 User Equipment (UE). User Equipment (or mobile sta-
tions in GSM networks) — the mobile device used by mobile sub-
scribers for using mobile services — is equipped with integrated
circuit Subscriber Identication Module (SIM) physical smart cards.
Modern smart cards are called the Universal Integrated Circuit
Cards (UICC). We use the term UE and SIM card unanimously to re-
fer to the mobile device and smart cards, respectively, of all mobile
generations. e UE contains all the hardware and soware, and
the SIM card includes a mobile subscription prole and the cryp-
tographic keys needed for communication with mobile networks.
Each SIM card is identied by its International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI). Furthermore, each SIM card slot is associated with
a unique identier called International Mobile Equipment Identity
(IMEI), which is used for registering the device to the network. So,
mobile SIMs with dual SIM feature will have two IMSI and IMEI
pairs.
Both IMSI and IMEI are transmied over the air to establish
radio channels between the UE and the mobile network, and they
remain a secret between the user and the mobile network. On
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the other hand, the Mobile Station International Subscriber Direc-
tory Number (MSISDN, i.e., the phone number) is the only public
identier that users can share with their friends and family. e
IMSI, MSISDN, and IMEI are unique and permanent identiers in
mobile communication, and they will change only when the user
changes its mobile subscription or equipment. Mobile networks
require to frequently check the subscription of the user to allow
it to use the network continuously. To avoid the repetitive use of
IMSI, provisional, and short-lived identiers such as Temporary
Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) or Globally Unique Temporary
ID (GUTI) are used as alternatives.
3.1.2 Radio Access Network (RAN). e radio access net-
work is the rst point of network access, which wirelessly connects
the UE over the air to the core network that provides telephony
services. is segment comprises cell towers of Base Transceiver
Station (BTS) and NodeB from 2G and 3G domains, respectively.
Furthermore, the evolved NodeB (eNodeB) and smart cells of the
4G (LTE) domain provide air connectivity with additional features
such as support for voice over WiFi. Since the radio access network
is responsible for keeping the connection to the rest of the network
intact without disconnecting, including when a user is on the move,
it is designed to transition between dierent generations through
handover mechanisms.
3.1.3 Core Network (CN). e core network is responsible
for managing mobility of the users by interacting with the RAN, for
initiating connections with other network operators and delivering
telephony services (such as voice calls, SMS, and Internet data
connections) requested by the users. As represented in gure 1, we
consider only the critical nodes from the packet/voice domain from
2G/3G and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) domain as part of CN.
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) from 4G/LTE EPC domain is a
master database that maintains user information (e.g., IMSI and
MSISDN) and their subscription information in one single node.
HSS is responsible for user authentication and access authorization
of what services can the users request based on their subscription
plans. HSS is also in charge of mobility management and support-
ing call/data session establishment, for example, by keeping track of
the user’s whereabouts and relaying it to other nodes. Home Loca-
tion Register (HLR) is the counterpart of HSS from the packet/voice
domain. However, HLR requires a separate node called Authentica-
tion Center (AuC) for user authentication, whereas it comes as an
integral part of HSS.
Serving Gateway (SGW) and Packet Data Network Gateway (PGW)
from the EPC domain are the user plane gateway nodes which route
and lter the IP trac between the UE and the external networks.
More specically, SGW is the point of interconnection between
the RAN and CN, whereas PGW is between CN and external roam-
ing/interconnection network, including the public internet or other
mobile operators. ey both are in charge of supporting accounting
and charging of services, managing user mobility, and providing
lawful interception for the user plane. Gateway GPRS support node
(GGSN) and Serving GPRS support node (SGSN) perform similar
functionalities in the 2G/3G networks.
Mobility Management Entity (MME) handles the control plane
trac in 4G networks. More specically, it handles signaling related
to session and mobility management, user authentication (with the
help of HSS), and selection of the gateways. MME is also respon-
sible for the lawful interception on the control plane. e Mobile
Switching Center (MSC) is responsible for similar functionalities in
the 2G/3G networks.
3.1.4 Service and applicationnetwork (SAN). is network
comprises of the billing and charging domain, IP multimedia subsys-
tem (IMS), and value-added services (VAS). e billing and charging
domain is usually considered as part of the core network in the
mobile network literature, as it was mainly used for accounting
the voice call usage in a standard manner [105]. While voice call
services are still part of the core network, current mobile networks
have evolved much beyond that, for example, to bill for the usage
through IMS and VAS networks.
e IMS domain integrates mobile and xed voice communica-
tions with Internet technologies. One of the key features of IMS is
the standardization of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [75], which
enables third-parties (who are not mobile operators) to provide
voice and media services over the IP-to-telephony networks. Sim-
ilarly, mobile operators partner with various third-party vendors
to oer a wide range of value-added services, such as missed call
and voice box services, mobile commerce and advertisements, gam-
ing, and on-demand streaming. Mobile commerce is another such
partnership where the mobile users can buy commodities from
registered third-party vendors, and the value of the commodity is
charged towards the user’s mobile subscription. Such partnerships
increase revenue to the operators and provide a large user base to
the vendors in exchange for the operator’s service fee.
3.1.5 Operations, support&maintenancenetwork (OSMN).
Most operators support multiple generations (from the modern 4G
to legacy 2G) of mobile network infrastructure. Given the heteroge-
neous and complex nature of such networks, the mobile operators
collaborate with external vendors to manage, congure, and mon-
itor their networks. Such vendors are known as the Operations
Support System (OSS) in the literature; however, we refer to them
as “Operations, support and maintenance network” (OSMN) to
indicate their broad range of functionalities. OSMN requires a con-
nection to every node from RAN, CN, and SAN for managing and
troubleshooting purposes.
3.1.6 Interconnection and roaming network (IRN). So far,
we have described the dierent kinds of network subsystems that
belong to a single mobile network operator. ese network subsys-
tems are collectively referred to as the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN). Each operator owning such PSTN networks, along
with their xed Public land mobile networks (PLMN), communi-
cates with one another to provide seamless mobile communication
between their respective users. Also, operators communicate with
each other during “roaming” where a user goes out of its home op-
erator’s geographical coverage area and visits of another operator.
In such cases, the user will still be able to use its mobile services
through the network of the visited operator. We use Interconnec-
tion and Roaming Network (IRN) as a generic term to refer to such
operator-to-operator communication.
Similarly, each mobile network also has to provide internet con-
nections to its users, for example, for mobile browsing, SIP calls, and
other IP-based communication. In such contexts, the core network
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connects service and application networks to the public Internet.
In such operator-to-internet connections, what comes towards the
operator’s network is outside the control of the mobile operators.
3.2 Communication between the networks
We now describe how the aforementioned networked subsystems
communicate with each other or within themselves. To limit the
complexity, we only provide a high-level overview with relevant
communication protocols used by each subsystem.
3.2.1 UE with RAN. User equipment connects with base sta-
tions over radio channels where both the UE and base stations
exchange generic broadcast and paging messages to inform each
other about their whereabouts. A dedicated radio channel is es-
tablished when a call, SMS, or browsing sessions are initiated. A
challenge-response Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) pro-
tocol is also run over the radio channel to derive session keys
between the UE and the network. Only the UE authenticates itself
to the network in GSM networks, whereas in 3G and 4G, AKA
protocol is extended to provide mutual authentication.
3.2.2 Core networkwith other networks. Most of the inter-
actions that the CN does with other nodes involve signaling, a term
that refers to the use of signals for controlling communications,
for mobility management and call establishment. e 2G and 3G
networks use Signalling System 7 (SS7) or SIGTRAN (the adaptation
of SS7 over IP) as signaling protocols. e SS7 protocol stack was
developed in the days of xed landlines to exchange information
among dierent nodes of the same operator or between operators
and eventually adapted to mobile communication. While SS7 and
SIGTRAN are replaced by Diameter protocol in 4G networks, SS7 is
still the extensively used signaling protocol today due to the domi-
nance of 2G networks around the globe. Inter-generation signaling
communication (2G/3G to 4G or vice versa) is facilitated by Inter
Working functions (IWF) on the edge nodes.
GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) is another signaling protocol
that is common across all generations of mobile networks for sig-
naling related to maintaining a data connection (i.e., for internet
access) while on the move and for carrying the data.
3.2.3 OSMN with other networks. OSMN relies mainly on
the Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP) and Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to provide remote network
conguration and management of the operator’s nodes. Other
popular protocols such as the Secure Shell (SSH), File Transfer
Protocol (FTP), Virtual Private Networks (VPN), Representational
State Transfer (REST) and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
are also commonly used to provide the OSMN with command-line
or user interfaces for administering the nodes.
3.2.4 Transport networks. IP-based network transport is used
extensively in mobile communication systems, for example, while
establishing a data service from the UE to an IP endpoint (such
as a web server), or while using signaling protocols over an IP
relay network. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is
used as a transport layer protocol between the nodes within an
operator. In the case of roaming or communication with other
operators, the guidelines for inter-service provider IP backbone
(as per IR.34 [73]) recommends using Internet Protocol Security
(IPSec) or other VPN connectivity. However, instead of VPNs, they
use NAT middleboxes for separating private networks of mobile
operators from the public Internet. Although both the user (data)
and control (signaling) trac is separated from each other, miscon-
gurations or security loopholes in the private networks may allow
non-operators to tamper with such trac.
3.3 Potential adversaries
Based on capabilities and type of access to the dierent subsystems
of mobile communications, we consider the following potential
adversaries.
3.3.1 Radio link aackers. Inexpensive hardware [59] and
open source soware modules [72] have proliferated security re-
search of radio communication outside the mobile operations indus-
try. However, they have also given a chance for evil actors to build
tools and products that undermine the security of radio channels,
which otherwise would have been not possible. With such tools,
radio link aackers can exploit the fact that mobile phones have no
way of authenticating legitimate base stations during their initial
connection establishment phase [92, 133, 178].
3.3.2 Evil mobile operators. As per the current standards,
the phone encrypts the communication between itself and the radio
access network using the keys stored on the SIM card. Encryption
beyond radio networks can exist, but only in the form of data trans-
mission inside encrypted tunnels. Mobile operators need to route
the communication to other operators, and both operators partici-
pating in the communication will have access to unencrypted data
inside the tunnel if it exists. Such access is an accepted norm since
the inception of global mobile communication systems because
the interconnection protocols (e.g., SS7) were built for mutually
trusting government-owned mobile operators. Now that things
have changed, most of the mobile operators are private entities, and
the government itself can be a potential threat. Having access to
unencrypted data and control over routing gives mobile operators
the ability to impersonate other trusted operators easily.
3.3.3 Human Insiders. Humans are always considered as one
of the weakest links in system security because they are prone to
make mistakes. Employees of mobile operators or OSM networks
can go rogue to exploit their privileges to leak sensitive data [90],
for the sake of their ideologies (e.g., whistle-blowing), or sell them
for nancial gain [40]. Carelessness and lack of security education
can also make human insiders gullible, e.g., to social engineering,
misconguring nodes, or to disregard operational security. In any
case, human insiders, with their direct access to critical infrastruc-
ture, are potential adversaries.
3.3.4 Hardware and SIM manufacturers. Manufacturer of
network nodes and phone hardware with evil intents can be po-
tential aackers as they can induce threats in the hardware supply
chains. Bugs at the hardware-level are challenging to trace and
coming to light only recently [147]. SIM card manufacturers also
pose similar threats by distributing SIMs with buggy features or
backdoors. On the other hand, SIM cards also contain private keys
used for encrypting the over-the-air radio communication. Careless
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management of the key generation infrastructure or cooperation
with other actors (e.g., oppressive governments) pose a serious
threat to mobile communication [158].
3.3.5 Soware and OS vendors. Mobile networks involve a
large number of open-source or proprietary soware components
to enable the regular functioning of the communication. Similar
to hardware, the soware supply chain is also prone to contain
intentional or accidental vulnerabilities. Due to its complex and
closed nature, breaking into the core network requires in-depth
knowledge and skills, whereas, with publicly available forensic
tools, aackers can exploit common vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL in-
jection [176]) in the soware stack of routers and other network
devices [43, 77]. Since soware and OS vendors may become a
medium of soware supply chain inltration, we consider them as
potential adversaries.
3.3.6 Law enforcement and oppressive governments. Le-
gal entities such as the law enforcement agencies have separate
interface standards for lawful access to mobile communication sys-
tems [58, 113], and every mobile operator has to support it based
on the laws of a nation. Nonetheless, such entities have exploited
mobile communication data outside the lawful interfaces, e.g., in
mass surveillance programs [66] and malware campaigns [95]. Con-
sidering the power and interest of nation-state actors in obtaining
access to the internal networks of mobile operators, including inl-
trating into hardware or soware supply chains, we treat them as
potential aackers to mobile systems.
3.3.7 Evil mobile users. Most mobile phones contain an ap-
plication processor, for running the mobile OS and general user
applications, and a baseband processor for the radio soware stack
involving communication over cellular networks. e former is usu-
ally open-sourced and freely available for users to run mobile apps
of their choice. e baseband processor, however, is proprietary,
and accessing them requires reverse engineering. Nonetheless, mo-
bile users have access to both of these. On the one hand, a skillful
user can build apps, e.g., to modify trac (mostly web) transmiing
out of the UE to gain free data services. On the other hand, he
can also tamper with the baseband processors, e.g., to spoof its
identity to the mobile network. Given the UE-side tampering capa-
bilities, we treat skillful mobile users with evil intent as potential
adversaries.
4 THREAT MODELING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we introduce the “Bhadra” threat modeling frame-
work. More specically, we describe the methodology that we
followed and our design choices. We also dene the building blocks
(i.e., the tactics and techniques) of our model. is section serves as
a preliminary to the rest of the paper.
4.1 Methodology
e methodology that we followed to develop our threat modeling
framework is represented in Figure 2. We used the existing aacks
and defenses literature from the following two groups as references
to build our framework.
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Attack Steps 
Points of
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Attack
methods &
strategies
Resulting
Harms
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Attack
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Figure 2: Overview of methodology
• Group I: is group comprises of peer-reviewed academic
publications and presentations at information security con-
ferences. It oers a rich resource of individual aacks
in-depth about the aack ow and root cause.
• Group II: e literature in this group is curated by stan-
dardization bodies from the mobile communication sector
(e.g., 3GPP, GSMA, ETSI) and government agencies (e.g.,
ENISA and NIST). It contains a generic summary of subsets
of aacks as well as best practice guidelines and recom-
mendations for building defensive strategies.
Firstly, we extracted the “aack steps” from the literature group I,
which is usually available in the form of message sequence charts
and followed by brief descriptions. en, we populated the “points
of aack initiation”, “methods and strategies” of an aacker, and
the “harms” caused from each aack. Similarly, we populated the
generic “categories of aacks” and “recommended defense” strategies
from literature group II.
Secondly, by nding commonalities in the points of aack ini-
tiation and aack methods, we grouped them into abstractions of
dierent “categories of techniques”. We cross-referenced the defense
strategies (populated from group II) with the categories of tech-
niques to validate whether an aack execution bypasses any of the
recommended defenses. is cross-referencing led to deduce a tech-
niques category called “Defense evasion”. Similarly, by deducing
commonalities between resulting harms (from group I) and aack
categories (from group II), we group them into dierent “tactical
categories”. While dening the tactical categories, we aligned them
with the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which indeed was our initial
requirement. We could retain names of tactics from ATT&CK with
only a few modications to customize it into the context of mobile
communications. Finally, we represent the techniques as rows and
tactics as column headers to form the Bhadra framework.
About our design choice. e ATT&CK framework focuses on
documenting common tactics, techniques, and procedures of mal-
ware and advanced persistent threats to build a knowledge base of
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adversary’s oensive behaviors through aack life cycles against
particular platforms (e.g., Windows). It is based on real-world ob-
servations gathered, e.g., through malware samples, penetration
testing, and threat intelligence reports. It focuses on how adver-
saries interact with the system during an aack rather than the
tools or malware. Such behavioral modeling of aackers from the
previously known aacks helps to recognize the responsible adver-
sary groups [5] and defend against them during the early phases of
an aack.
Our preference for aligning the Bhadra framework with the
ATT&CK might seem biased to favor the requirement of the mo-
bile service provider company, which uses it for their enterprise
management side (refer to Section 2). However, that is not the
case. Unlike the aacks considered by the ATT&CK framework,
the aacks on mobile communication systems are not conducted by
any publicly known adversary groups. Most aacks are presented
by academic researchers and information security professionals.
Nonetheless, by studying the message sequence charts of the at-
tacks, we believe that modeling the adversary behavior as if it is
from a specic group is still useful. is is because the aack ows,
which can be mapped to adversary’s behavior, indicate the limi-
tations on how adversaries can compromise the system and the
loosely protected aspects that need more rigorous security. Also,
the matrix representation not only helps in building a systematic
categorization and common taxonomy based on the known aacks
but also to retain the aack ows of a message sequence chart.
4.2 Tactics and techniques
We consider the end-to-end communication over the mobile net-
works as the primary asset to be protected. In this realm, all entities
facilitates the communication, right from the user equipment to
all the network nodes (represented in Figure 1), are considered
as the assets to be protected. We consider any scenarios where
functionalities of the nodes are misused or abused, which could
incur nancial or accounting discrepancies to a mobile operator as
valid threats. We also consider the aacks that aect the mobile
users, say harm privacy of their communication, or incurs them
a fee for services that they have not used. However, we omit the
threats from malicious apps or malware on their devices that steal
sensitive information (e.g., banking credentials, or passwords to
online services) but do not aect mobile communication as such.
e threat scope is abstracted in the form of various tactics and
techniques that act as the building blocks of our framework. ey
are dened as follows.
Tactics represents the adversary’s tactical goals, i.e., the reason
(“why”) for performing a particular action during an aack. As
contextual categories of underlying techniques, tactics represent
the types (sub-phases) of adversarial actions right from the begin-
ning of an aack until it ends. We organize the tactics in the way
they represent the natural aack strategy of an adversary. More
specically, the adversary nds (or knows) a weak point to mount
the aack, he then executes the aack, and nally achieves his
objectives by gathering the desired results. Most of the aacks have
one or more techniques from each of the tactics. However, some at-
tacks may skip some of the intermediate tactics and corresponding
techniques.
Techniques refers to the “how” and “what” aspect of adversarial
strategy and adds more context to adversarial tactics. Techniques
could represent individual actions (grouped by their nature) taken
by an adversary to achieve its tactical objectives. It could also
refer to the information that the adversary learns by performing a
specic action. ere are dierent types of actions (or information
that can be learned from an action) that an adversary can perform to
achieve each of his tactical objectives. is is why we have multiple
techniques under each tactical category.
While deducing tactics and techniques for our framework, we
referred to both enterprise and mobile categories of ATT&CK frame-
work and adapted them as per our needs. e techniques in our
model are specic to mobile communications, and the tactics are
aligned with the ATT&CK framework with minimal modication
as follows. Firstly, we dropped the execution and privilege escalation
categories because we do not have sucient public information on
specic techniques that can fall under that category. Nonetheless,
network nodes and routers still run common operating systems
(e.g., Linux), and all the techniques under execution and privilege
escalation tactical category from ATT&CK may still be valid here.
We group them into a single technique called “exploit platform-
and service-specic vulnerabilities”. Secondly, the commands and
control tactic contained techniques that adversaries may use to
communicate with systems under their control, for example, by
mimicking normal, expected trac. We aptly used the same de-
nition; however, aptly renamed it as standard protocols due to its
prevalent use in the mobile communication community. irdly, we
combined credential access, exltration and collection into a single
tactic called collection. Finally, we also combined impact from enter-
prise domain, network eects and remote service eects and mobile
domain to a single category called impacts. We also modied its
denition to refer to the highest level of the result achieved by the
adversary.
We describe the tactics and techniques categories in terms of at-
tack mounting, execution and result gathering phases of the aack
life cycle in Sections 5, 6 and 7 respectively. In each of these sec-
tions, we describe tactics and underlying techniques (emphasized
in “bold”) in detail with relevant examples and references. With all
tactics and techniques, Figure 3 represents the Bhadra framework.
5 ATTACK MOUNTING PHASE
e rst phase of the aack life cycle is the aack mounting where
the adversary nds a weak point as its target to mount the aack
and ensures that its control persists as long as it is required. e
adversary may also gain more information to prepare for the next
phases. We recognize three tactics in the aack mounting phase,
namely, initial access, persistence, and discovery.
5.1 Initial Access
Initial access represents the group of techniques or aack vectors
that the adversaries use as entry points, e.g., by exploiting weak-
nesses in the system or by luring humans with access to the system.
In its entirety, the techniques under the initial access tactics rep-
resent various entry points through which adversaries can launch
aacks on the mobile communication systems.
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“Attacks from UE” refers to any technique that involves the
aacks launched by the soware or hardware components of the
user equipment to send malicious trac into the mobile network.
We see mobile malware as the malicious apps installed on the
UE that oen compromise the mobile user’s privacy by stealing
sensitive information or capturing the user’s activities. However,
there are other kinds of malware observed in the wild that aects
mobile communication. A large number of UEs infected with such
malware can form cellular bots and overload the critical nodes (e.g.,
HLR/HSS) of the operator [174]. Massive trac overload from the
user endpoints, especially from IoT devices, is an expected threat
in the 5G network, and there are solutions proposed to x it [155].
Besides malware, skillful mobile users can also inject malicious
trac into the mobile network. More specically, mobile users can
create malformed IP trac emerging from the UE, e.g., to avail free
data services [135]. Such aacks were popular when there was a
much stricter cap on mobile data usage.
e “SIM-based attacks” are the techniques that involve any
physical smart cards, namely SIM from 2G, USIM from 3G, and
UICC from 4G networks. e most well-known examples of SIM-
based aacks are the swapping [109] and cloning [22] techniques.
SIM swapping aacks work by convincing customer service repre-
sentatives of a mobile operator, e.g., at a local retail store, to give a
replacement SIM for a subscription that is still in use. In legitimate
scenarios, SIM replacement is valid to help mobile users who have
lost their SIM cards. e representative authenticates the person
who claims to be the previous owner of the SIM based on correct
answers to questions about personal details or call records. Such
human-to-human authentication is not secure by any means. Also,
there is a big market to recruit customer service representatives
of mobile operators [64] to conduct SIM swapping at a large scale.
Successful acquisition of a SIM gives the aacker access to the IMSI
and master encryption key, which can be used by the aacker to
impersonate the mobile subscriber to the network. SIM cloning (or
rooting) has a similar goal as SIM swapping to acquire the IMSI.
However, the aacker relies on physical access to the SIM to ex-
tract all contents and to make a replica. SIM cloning can also be
conducted remotely in certain specic scenarios [128]. A relatively
new and lesser-known type of SIM-based aack is exploiting func-
tionalities of the SIM card. We discuss more in detail about one
such recent aack called SIMjacker [16] in Section 8.1.1.
e “attacks from radio access network” are the techniques
where an adversary with radio capabilities impersonates the mobile
network to the UE (or vice versa) and becomes a man-in-the-middle.
e main requirement for these aacks to work is that the adversary
has to be present within the radio range of the victim so that the
victim’s UE would pick up the adversary’s radio signals instead of
benign signals from the operator’s cell towers (base stations). A
popular example in this category is the use of IMSI catchers (also
known as stingrays) where an adversary steals IMSIs (or phone
numbers in some cases) from the UEs within the adversary’s close
vicinity [37, 133, 162, 163]. Depending on the generation of mobile
communication, such adversaries can intercept the communication
(e.g., SMS and calls) emerging from the UE, can act as jammers by
denying service, and track the presence of a specic UE in a given
location [126]. Since the communication interception is limited
only to 2G networks, the adversary in most cases may simply want
to downgrade 3G and 4G connections to 2G. Nonetheless, IMSI
catching aacks without downgrading are still possible in some
cases [38]. Aacks using femtocells (home nodeB) work similar to
IMSI catchers but mostly in 3G radio networks [37, 70].
e “attacks from other mobile networks” and the “attacks
with physical access to transport network” techniques can be
conducted by evil mobile operators, law enforcement agencies for
legal interception and human insiders with access to network nodes.
e major dierence between these two techniques is that the for-
mer aack technique is launched from a partner mobile operator
via IRN, mainly during roaming scenarios, and the laer can also be
launched from the victim’s own operator’s core network. In either
case, the adversaries mostly rely on launching messages of standard
cryptographic protocols for location tracking, communication in-
terception, denial of service, billing frauds [143]. Unlike the aack
techniques with the radio access network, the adversary’s presence
within the radio range of the victim is not required. Instead, the
adversary can remotely conduct the aacks at a larger scale from
any corner of the world.
e “attacks from IP-based attacks” techniques mostly are
launched from the service and application network, which allows
non-operator entities to infuse malicious trac into an opera-
tor’s network. Operators become vulnerable to the entire arsenal
of Internet-based aacks [96], including aacks on inter-domain
routing [41]. Most commonly, such techniques aim for billing
frauds [186] and denial of service [53, 166] using SIP protocols.
e GPRS trac emerging from the interconnection and roaming
network can also give initial access to the adversaries due to the
vulnerabilities in the architecture [181, 182] or due to lack of se-
curity measures in signaling protocols [137]. Similarly, exploiting
the Domain Network System (DNS), which maps the mobile IP
addresses to human-readable hostnames, can also be used as an
initial access technique for conducting denial of service aacks
on the operator’s core network [170]. Mobile botnets comprising
compromised UEs can also be the initial access for IP-based aacks
that result in trac outage of mobile networks [21].
e “insider attacks and human errors” technique involve
the intentional aacks and unintentional mistakes from human
insiders with access to any component of the mobile communica-
tion ecosystem. Such human insiders could be the employees of
operators with evil intent or lack of security knowledge, former
employees that can still access the network or whistleblowers. ey
can exist anywhere from the customer service front desks [64] to
the OSM network that has access to almost all critical nodes of the
mobile communication [31]. Human errors (including miscongu-
rations) and the help of insiders bring various threats that forfeit
any technical security measures that exist. Hence, they are oen
leveraged by adversaries as the initial access techniques. Insider
threats evolve into a separate category, and it can further be studied
with human-centric models that are specically designed for this
purpose[131], which is outside the scope of our work.
5.2 Persistence
is tactical category represents the group of adversarial techniques
for retaining the foothold gained on the target system through the
initial access. While it may be sucient for an adversary to have
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one-o access to launch an aack, more advanced aacks may
require maintaining continuous access, e.g., to complete multi-step
aack procedures or just to control the target for a prolonged period.
Initial access (e.g., gained through valid credentials) may provide
continuous access to the adversary until it is changed. However,
the adversary may also want to retain access to the system to avoid
interruptions like in the case of system restart, conguration or
credential changes.
An adversary retains control over an infected SIM card or UE
hardware (e.g., in case of supply chain bugs) as long as it takes
the victim to replaces them. Unlike soware vulnerabilities, these
vulnerabilities cannot be eradicated with a security patch. Malware
installed in the case of mobile bots or through the malicious app
will give persistent access for as long as they remain undetected by
mobile anti-virus solutions or by networks. Likewise, adversaries
retain control over the infected network nodes for as long as it takes
the operators to detect and patch them. While there are tools for
anomaly detection of trac emerging from a compromised nodes,
routine forensic analysis are rarely done unless there are known
security issues. In case of initial access techniques that rely on
radio access, the adversary persists its control as long as the victim
UE is connected to the spoofed radio network.
Similar to UE- and network-based malware, it is acceptable to
assume that human insiders retain access to the initial foothold
for as long as they are undetected. ere are various methods and
soware for insider threat management to detect the presence of
human insiders [156]. However, their eectiveness remains opaque
to the general public. A human insider adversary may try to hide
its presence from the protection mechanism by opening up covert
channels on the point of initial access. Such covert channels could
be anything from opening a network port to installing malicious
script or remote management soware for accessing the compro-
mised entity even if they lose control over their initial foothold.
ese kinds of persistence techniques are hard to detect without
regular sanity checks of network elements for all sorts of soware
and human vulnerabilities.
5.3 Discovery
e discovery tactics include the techniques used by adversaries to
gain more information about the surrounding environment of the
initial access point, such as system congurations, open ports, and
network of other accessible nodes. In most cases, discovery tactics
are used only network-side aacks rather than the aacks on the
user-side. Depending on the aack, the discovery tactic may be
part of the aack mounting or execution phase. If an adversary can
launch dierent aacks or have multiple objectives, the knowledge
gained by discovering the surrounding environment will decide
its next steps. For instance, if the adversary discovers a protection
mechanism that it is incapable of bypassing, they might decide not
to proceed further or simply change their original objective.
Regular Internet users are restricted by their Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) with port ltering, where the user’s ability to con-
nect or scan a port or IP outside of their normal Internal activities
is restricted. ISPs may also have transparent proxies that can se-
lectively censor and monitor the trac coming from a user. Such
ltering rules are the reason why an adversary cannot inspect
mobile communication networks even if they are visible to the
public Internet. So, an adversary who has gained access to any of
the internal nodes of an operator would use “port scanning or
sweeping” techniques to probe servers or hosts with open ports.
It is a permied action within the boundaries of network operators
as they are oen used by network and system administrators for
security audits and network maintenance purposes. However, once
inside the network, the adversaries can use the same techniques
to determine the open ports and potential services running behind
the ports. Such scanning gives information to the adversary about
whether a specic host is active on a network and the possibility
of compromising it by exploiting a known vulnerability.
e network of mobile operators is run as a private network and
separated from public Internet space. Network Address Translation
(NAT) middleboxes are used for translating private IP and port to a
public IP and port in the case of establishing an Internet connection
from a UE. Such private networks are part of Autonomous Systems
(AS), which are routable networks within the public Internet and
assigned to individual mobile operators. e Border Gateway Pro-
tocol (BGP) routing protocol which allows the AS of the operators
to connect to the Internet using their unique ASN number in BGP
conguration. An adversary may want to perform ASN and IP
lookups alongside port scanning to map their aack surface as a
perimeter within which it can access dierent targets. ere is a
wide range of publicly available resources for “perimeter map-
ping” techniques such as command-line utilities (e.g., nmap and
whois), web-based lookup tools and ocial APIs provided by the
Internet registrars that assign the ASNs.
Due to miscongurations, critical nodes of mobile operators are
sometimes are visible over public networks. ere are plenty of
public and commercial services that compile from multiple sources
and share almost real-time threat information of such publicly ex-
posed IPs of critical infrastructure and services behind such IPs with
known vulnerabilities [115, 172]. ere are dedicated search en-
gines (e.g., Shodan [123] and Censys [52]) that gather information
about vulnerable devices and networks by performing Internet-
wide scanning. Similar information can also be found by using
traditional search engines with advanced search options, which
is popularly known as Google dorking [171]. While such “threat
intelligence gathering” techniques are essential for mobile oper-
ators for tracking public visibility of their security aws, the same
can also be weaponized by adversaries for nding potential initial
access or for discovering targets within operator’s network.
All the above-mentioned discovery techniques are commonly
used for IP-based networks, and they may not be sucient for an
adversary to discover information about the nodes that do not rely
on typical IP protocols. More specically, the older mobile genera-
tions use point codes and Global Titles (GT) for uniquely identifying
signaling nodes and for signaling routing from core networks. Al-
though such numeric addresses work very much similar to that of
IP addresses, adversaries need dierent tools for scanning nodes
that are interconnected with protocols specic to the mobile com-
munication domain. Domain-specic protocols, such as GTP and
SCTP (from the SS7 stack), used within the premise of an operator’s
network are oen unauthenticated because a trusted environment
is assumed when these protocols are used. Hence, initial access to
the network alone suces for an adversary to prove its authenticity.
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In such cases, the adversary can use publicly available tools such
as GTScan [14], SigPloit [15], SCTPScan [108] and GTPScan [125]
for discovering the network that is not accessible via IP-based tools.
We collectively refer to the use of any such tools as CN-specic
scanning techniques.
All the above techniques allow an adversary to discover network
topological information, such as addressing, router and gateway
ltering, rewall rules, and addressing-based trust relationships
that are useful for the next phases of an aack. However, the
process is rigorous, time-consuming, and the adversary is at the
stake of being detected. On the other hand, if the adversary is, or
assisted by, a human insider with internal technical and business
documents of a network operator, it can save time and eort. For
instance, if the adversary can get access to the operator’s IR.21
related resources, which gives it an easy access to the operator’s and
its partner operators’ critical network assets. Every international
mobile operator has to maintain up-to-date information about their
own network infrastructure details, interconnection, roaming, and
inter-operator billing agreements in a standardized manner. GSMA
administers such databases containing IR.21 of all operators, and
each operator has access to it. Such sensitive information remains
out of reach of a regular person, but an insider with access to it
can benet heavily in discovery tactics. We refer to the use of such
sensitive databases as the Internal resource search technique.
Finally, just like how IP endpoints and core network nodes are
scanned or mapped, adversaries can also do the same for UEs; We
refer to this technique as UE knocking. Example uses of this
technique can be seen in the case of a radio link aackers or evil
mobile operators who test the presence or absence of an UE (based
on the associated IMSI) in a given location. UE knocking can also
be used for checking other SIM- and UE-specic parameters (e.g.,
support for specic mobile generation and cipher suites), which
helps the adversary in knowing its target more in detail.
6 ATTACK EXECUTION PHASE
Aack execution is the second phase of the aack life cycle where
the adversary launches the aack, to achieve its main objectives,
based on the preparation and information that it has sought from
the previous phase. We recognize three tactics in this phase, namely,
lateral movement, standard protocol misuse, and defense evasion.
6.1 Lateral Movement
Once the adversary discovers the surrounding environment of its
foothold on the initial access point, it may also want to extend
and infect other points of interest. It could either be part of the
adversarial strategy or simply the adversary wants to replicate
its aacks on all possible points that are accessible to it. In fact,
infecting other accessible points would be much easier or dierent
than gaining initial access. We group techniques through which
an adversary moves through the target system into the lateral
movement tactic. Similar to discover tactics, lateral movement is
used mostly in network-side aacks rather than the aacks on the
user-side.
One of the techniques used by adversaries, specically evil mo-
bile operators, is to exploit roaming agreements. Let us consider
a toy example to understand how this technique works in real-world
scenarios. Evil operator E has roaming and business agreements
with operatorA. Similarly,A has agreements with B and C. Such
agreements imply that E can communicate only with A and not
with B and C, whereas A can communicate with all E, B and C.
Any communication between operators without a valid agreement
will be blocked by the receiving operators to lter unwanted trac
from rogue and arbitrary operators. However, if E has sought initial
access on the premises ofA, it can exploitA’s roaming agreements
for lateral movement to communicate with B and C, which would
be not possible otherwise.
Abusing Inter-working functionalities is another technique
for adversaries to move between networks of dierent generations
laterally. Inter-working functions (3GPP TS 29.305 [12]) enable
interoperability between the network of operators during roam-
ing scenarios by translating communication messages from one
protocol stack to another, e.g., SS7 messages of 2G/GSM to Diam-
eter messages of 4G communication. Adversaries can abuse such
functionalities, by using them as aack translation black boxes, for
aacking higher generation networks with less secure lower gen-
eration networks [80]. Even though such functionalities provide
an easy way for operating complex interconnections with roam-
ing partners, the ip side of its usage will undermine the security
provided by the higher generations.
Although mobile networks seem very complicated from outside,
they are nothing but computing machines running commonly used
operating systems, soware, and services. Once the adversary has
inltrated into the internals of the network, it has ample opportuni-
ties and a much broader aack surface to explore. e adversary can,
e.g., conduct privilege escalation and process injection for gaining
administrative rights, password cracking of valid user accounts on
the nodes, exploit vulnerabilities in databases and le systems, and
take advantage of improper congurations of routers and switches.
We refer to them as the techniques for exploiting platform and
service-specic vulnerabilities. is broad technique category
can diverge into entirely dierent threat models that are outside
the scope of this work.
6.2 Standard Protocols Misuse
In aacks that involve malware or platform-specic vulnerabilities,
the adversary can execute a malicious script or override specic
congurations. However, adversarial aacks on mobile communi-
cation systems are oen conned to using standard communication
protocols. More specically, adversaries rely on exploiting their
access from a critical node and craing legitimate messages of
standard protocols with evil intent. is is possible because of
the continued use of legacy mobile communication protocols built
without modern security requirements. e adversaries have to
exploit the existence of a feature from such protocols rather than
nding any sophisticated vulnerabilities.
One of the examples of standard protocol misuse is in the GSM
network, which is one of the oldest but still the most predomi-
nantly used network today. With almost no cryptographic security
in terms of authentication, condentiality, and integrity, the Sig-
nalling System 7 (SS7) protocol stack used in GSM networks is
considered as one of the weakest links. Using SS7 messages as an
aack technique by adversaries with access to operator networks
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Figure 3: Bhadra threat modeling framework
has been in a discussion in mobile security communities for over
a decade now [55, 56, 143]. Solutions against these vulnerabili-
ties have also been proposed in various forms, e.g., using secure
tunneling [119, 161], rewalls [24, 124] and machine learning [89].
However, operators are reluctant to deploy the solutions at scale
due to operational costs and the burden of its management at a
global level. Also, nding hidden features of SS7 and weaponizing
them into aack vectors is an active security research theme [144].
In this realm, the SS7-based attacks technique continues to be a
constant threat until every single GSM network is upgraded.
Diameter protocol, the successor of SS7 for interconnection in
LTE networks, oers beer security features than SS7. Despite
that, many aacks that rely on SS7 can also be replicated using
Diameter, e.g., due to improper deployment of the security fea-
tures [104, 122, 138]. Also, SS7-based aacks can be translated into
Diameter aacks using GSM-to-LTE inter-working functions [80]
even if the adversary has limited knowledge of LTE networks. Since
Diameter-based attack techniques slightly dier from their SS7
counterparts, we treat it as a separate technique.
GTP is yet another protocol with no built-in security support e.g.,
for authentication. Unlike the above-mentioned signaling-based
aacks, which originate mostly from an evil roaming partner’s or
the operator’s own premise, the aack surface for GTP is much
broader. Adversaries can use GTP-based attacks techniques also
from external sources, including the public Internet. In this case,
successful aacks result in data interception, Internet service denial,
and billing frauds [107, 137].
DNS-based attack techniques come from a completely dierent
family of protocols that are not used for signaling in core networks.
DNS-based aacks are mainly used in billing frauds as the DNS traf-
c not counted when metering the data usage of mobile subscribers.
Data usage metering is based on TCP packets sent from the mobile
endpoints, and the metering starts when the rst TCP packet of a
data session reaches the boundaries of the core network. An ad-
versary can hide Internet trac within DNS requests that are part
of the data sessions and use the Internet for free-of-charge [135].
Furthermore, hijacking DNS requests over the radio network allow
redirecting them to adversary controlled servers, strip o the en-
cryption, and obtain user’s browsing data in plain text [152]. Such
techniques can also be used for generating spam trac that in-
curs over-billing discrepancies for the victim subscriber or operator.
Similar results can be achieved using GTP-based aacks. However,
the adversary has to be within an operator’s network.
e radio communication between the UE and mobile network
(base station) that takes place before the AKA protocol has no
encryption and integrity protection. e UE has to blindly trust
the network, which aracts adversaries with radio link capabilities
to exploit such trust using Pre-AKA attack techniques. While
these techniques are not protocols by themselves, instead, they
are the initial phases of standard protocols. Depending on the
generation of radio technology, the pre-AKA aack techniques are
used (e.g., by IMSI catchers) for collecting both permanent (IMSI
and IMEI) and temporary (TMSI) identiers, for precisely locating
a UE within a radio range, for downgrading to lower generations
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with less security and for denying any mobile service within a radio
range [71, 106, 129, 163]. As a well-studied theme, these aacks
are addressed in every AKA protocol development with signicant
improvements. However, even if practically executing such aacks
is geing harder, new theoretical loopholes are oen caught during
formal analysis [20, 28, 35, 47].
6.3 Defense Evasion
Adversarial techniques used for bypassing protection mechanisms,
including evading detection of an adversary’s presence, are grouped
into the defense evasion tactical category. e techniques under
this category could still use techniques from any other tactical
groups; however, mainly to subvert the defense mechanism of the
system.
e operating systems, soware, and services used on the net-
work nodes are prone to security vulnerabilities and installation of
unwanted malware. Although operators conduct routine security
audits to track and patch the vulnerabilities or remove the malware
from the infected nodes, their eectiveness is not known to the
public. Any means by which an adversary can remain undetected
from such audits are referred to as the security audit camouage
technique.
Mobile operators employ several defenses in terms of securing
their network trac. For instance, operators maintain a whitelist of
IPs and GTs of nodes from their own infrastructure and their part-
ner operators (as agreed in IR 21), and trac from only these nodes
are processed. Similarly, a blacklist is also maintained to control
spam due to conguration errors and malicious trac. Anything
from the blacklist is banned from entering the operator’s network.
Such defense mechanisms may defend against unsolicited trac
from external networks (e.g., from the public Internet and SAN), but
it barely serves its purpose in the case of aacks from inter-operator
communications. Since most of the communication protocols are
unauthenticated in nature, an aacker with knowledge of identi-
ers of the allowed nodes (i.e. gained during the discovery phase)
can impersonate their identity. We call it the blacklist evasion
technique.
NAT middleboxes are used for separating private networks of
mobile operators from public Internet works as the second line
of defense. However, studies have shown that the middleboxes
deployed by operators are prone to miscongurations that allow
adversaries to inltrate malicious trac into mobile networks e.g.,
by spoong the IP headers [180]. Some of the other NAT vulner-
abilities lie in IPv4-to-IPv6 address mapping logic, which can be
exploited by adversaries to exhaust the resources, wipe out the
mapping, or to assist with blacklist evasion [82]. Adversaries use
such middleboxmisconguration exploit techniques to launch
denial-of-service or over-billing aacks [112].
A more advanced form of defense against signaling aacks is
available in the form of rewalls. Some operators deploy stateful
rewalls that are readily available as commercial [165] and open-
source products [93]. While only a small fraction of operators use
such rewalls [57], they are expected to distinguish legitimate net-
work trac from malicious ones by tracking the operating state
and characteristics of network trac traversing it. However, adver-
saries (e.g., evil operators) can exploit the implicit trust between
roaming partners as a bypass rewall technique. As a reminder,
signaling aacks that are based on SS7, Diameter, and GTP pro-
tocols are no dierent from regular messages exchanged between
operators in genuine roaming scenarios [140]. By hiding aack
trac amongst the massive amount legitimate signaling trac ex-
changed between roaming partners, adversaries can always expect
it to bypass the rewall protection. Other solutions, such as using
machine learning features in rewalls [89], are still in their early
stages of research. As bypassing techniques would also evolve
alongside rewall protection mechanisms, we expect such aack
techniques to remain valid in the future.
Most of the SS7-based aacks exploit the aw in the SMS de-
livery mechanism for inbound o-network SMS messages where
delivering SMS is assumed to be the responsibility of the operator
from where the SMS is originated rather than the operator to which
the SMS needs to be delivered. In genuine cases, the operator of the
SMS’s origin requests the operator (i.e., roaming network) where
the SMS has to be delivered about the location of the UE roaming
in its network. e laer has no option other than to pass the
location information to such requests from an external network
with no means of authentication. However, such mechanisms can
be exploited by a core network aacker who can spoof of an opera-
tor to deliver SMS and obtain the location of the UE if the IMSIs
of its victims are known. SMS home routing is a defense mecha-
nism [11]), where an additional SMS router intervenes in external
location queries for SMS deliveries, and the roaming network takes
the responsibility of delivering the SMS without providing location
information to the external entity. Although many operators have
implemented SMS home routing solutions, there are no silver bul-
lets. If the SMS routers are incorrectly congured, adversaries can
hide SMS delivery location queries within other messages so that
the SMS home router fails to process them [139]. We refer to it as
the bypass home routing technique.
Aacks on the radio access networks are well-studied and newer
generations are designed to address the weaknesses in previous gen-
erations. Usage of weak cryptographic primitives, lack of integrity
protection of the radio channels, and one-sided authentication (only
from the network) remain as the problem of mostly GSM only ra-
dio communication. So, radio link aackers use downgrading as
an aack technique to block service over newer generations and
accept to serve only in the GSM radio network. e downgrading
technique works similarly in the core network, where the adversary
accepts to serve only in SS7-based signaling instead of Diameter-
based signaling. Using interworking functions for inter-generation
communication translation could make the downgrading aacks
much easier [80].
Redirection technique is a variant of the downgrading tech-
nique, where an adversary forcefully routes the trac through
networks or components that are under its control. By redirecting
trac to an unsafe network, the adversary can intercept mobile
communication (e.g., calls and SMS) on the RAN part [188]. Redirec-
tion aacks on the core network result in not only communication
interception, but also in billing discrepancies, as an adversary can
route the calls of a mobile user from its home network through a
foreign network on a higher call rate [56].
Protection on the UE is mainly available in the form of antivirus
apps as a defense against viruses and malware that steals sensitive
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information (e.g., banking credentials and user passwords) or track
user activities. Simple visual cues on UE (such as notications)
could also be a protection mechanism by itself. Unfortunately,
mobile network-based aacks cannot be detected or defended eec-
tively from UE’s side by traditional antivirus apps, and such aacks
do not trigger any visual signs. Although there are aempts for
defending against radio link aacks [39, 49, 50, 177], including city-
wide studies to detect IMSI catchers [116, 127], their eectiveness
is still under debate [36]. Similarly, there are recent aempts to
detect signaling aacks using distance bounding protocol run from
a UE [134]. However, such solutions are still in the research phase,
and their eectiveness on a large scale is still untested. To this end,
the absence of robust detection and defense mechanisms on the
UE is, in fact, an evasion mechanism for an adversary. We refer to
them as UE protection evasion techniques.
7 ATTACK RESULTS PHASE
Aack results are the last phase of the aack life cycle, where the
adversary achieves his main objectives. e tactics in this phase
imply the end result, in terms of collection of information that is of
utmost interest to the adversary and nal impact of an aack.
7.1 Collection
e collection tactics represents sensitive information gathered or
stolen by an adversary by achieving any of its tactical objectives
during aack mounting or execution phase.
Stealing legitimate admin credentials for critical nodes is ben-
ecial for the adversary to increase its chances of persistence to the
target or masquerade its activities. ere are various well-known
methods for exploiting platform and service-specic vulnerabili-
ties (e.g., key-logging and brute-forcing) by which adversaries can
collect such information [7]. Mobile communication systems oer
various other sensitive information as well.
User-specic identiers such as IMSI and IMEI are an indica-
tor for who owns UE with a specic subscription and where a UE
is located physically. Since mobile users always keep their mobile
phones physically near them, an adversary with the knowledge
of these permanent identiers will be able to determine whether
or not a user is in a specic location. On the other hand, tempo-
rary identiers (e.g., TMSI and GUTI) are used to reduce the usage
of permanent identiers like IMSI over radio channels. Although
the temporary identiers are supposed to change frequently and
expected to live for a short period, research has shown that it is
not the case [23, 81]. Reuse of these temporary identiers forfeits
its benets and yields to mapping them back to IMSI. Hence, the
collection of temporary identiers is equally valuable as that of the
permanent ones. We consider encryption keys that reside in the
SIM cards and the MSISDN (phone numbers) also as user-specic
identiers as they are equally aractive to adversaries. Unlike the
rest of the identiers, MSISDN is public by nature. However, the col-
lection of arbitrary MSISDNs from a specic location [184] makes
it potentially sensitive like the rest of the identiers. Besides the
obvious privacy concern of sensitive information to unintended
entities, the user-specic identiers also form a crucial part of ad-
versarial tactics, for example, for the successful use of standard
protocols ( 6.2) in the core network communication.
e acquisition of user-specic identiers suces in case, say if
the adversary’s motive is to obtain the location of a specic user.
However, the adversary can collect several types of user-specic
data if he has a much broader motive. Such data include, e.g., the
content of SMS and calls, location dumps from base stations, call
and billing records, and browsing-related data (such as DNS queries
and unencrypted browsing sessions).
Adversaries aim to collect network-specic identiers such
as GTs and IPs of critical nodes and Tunnel Endpoint Identier
(TEID) of GTP tunnels from operators’ networks. Adversaries
may also be interested in network-specic data that are obtained
mainly during the execution of discovery tactics. Such data in-
cludes, e.g., the network topology, the trust relationship between
dierent nodes, routing metadata, and sensitive documents.
7.2 Impacts
is tactical category contains the main objectives achieved by the
adversary by following a series of techniques that belong to all
previous tactical categories.
Some degree of user location tracking is required for the funda-
mental working of mobile network technologies (e.g., for continu-
ous handovers), where a UE regularly discloses its location to the
mobile networks in legitimate scenarios. e same can be exploited
by dierent kinds of adversaries, from almost every network subsys-
tem, for conducting location tracking aacks. For example, radio
link aackers can use fake base stations either to check whether UEs
are present in a given location or to obtain precise coordinates of
the UE [92, 106, 133, 163]. Similarly, adversaries with access to core
network can misuse signaling protocols (e.g., SS7 [55, 56] and Diam-
eter [80, 145]) or exploit vulnerabilities in the signaling plane [149]
for obtaining location information. IP-based aack vectors from
the IMS domain (e.g., over VoLTE) also yields similar results [100].
e precision of location obtained, however, varies — from a few
meters to tracking area of an MME to a country-wide service area
of an operator — in accordance with the adversary’s capabilities
and objectives. Although location tracking aacks directly aect
the privacy of the mobile users, their extended implications include
using the obtained location for spoong against core networks [83],
denying service to users, and incurring nancial loss to operators.
We believe that the location tracking aacks are used as a prepara-
tory step for enabling other aacks that we discuss further in this
section.
Voice calls and SMS are two of the native applications of mo-
bile communication systems that lack features (such as end-to-end
encryption) that can be achieved with modern secure communica-
tion protocols.Although there have been proposals (e.g., for SMS
encryption), they have been disregarded by standardization bod-
ies and operators due to their deployment complexity [120, 157].
Currently, only the radio channel between UE and base stations is
protected with encryption, and everything beyond that (i.e., inside
core network) is transported in plain text. erefore, the security of
calls and SMS relies on the strength of encryption for over-the-air
radio communication and blind trust on the operators for traversal
through the core network. Unfortunately, both of these are vulner-
able to calls eavesdropping and SMS interception aacks.
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On the radio network side, adversaries can use fake base stations
to force a UE to transmit all its communication without encryption
in some cases and intercept the non-encrypted transmission of voice
calls and SMS. However, it is not always possible. Adversaries oen
rely on weaker encryption schemes to achieve passive interception.
For example, many cryptanalysis [27, 32, 33, 51, 179] and rainbow
table-based aacks [130, 132] have shown that encryption schemes
used in GSM radio communication can be broken. Since this is
mostly the problem of GSM networks, adversaries use downgrading
technique (refer to Section 6.3) from a higher generation network,
passively record the encrypted communication so that it can be
decrypted later.
Aacks from the core network, on the other hand, allow an
adversary to intercept and eavesdrop calls and SMS actively. More
specically, regular call setup and SMS delivery workows during
legitimate roaming scenarios give away control to route the calls
and SMS to external entities (roaming partners). Unfortunately,
there is no means of verifying authorization of the request from
external entities during such scenarios. An adversary can abuse it
to redirect the calls and SMS to an unsafe network (or node) that
it controls. Since communication within the core network occurs
without condentiality protection (i.e., no encryption), the adver-
saries can intercept them easily. Such aacks are peculiar artifacts
of SS7-based aacks in GSM networks. Due to a lack of authentica-
tion and authorization of signaling messages, adversaries can either
impersonate legitimate core network nodes or manipulate the mo-
bile subscriber proles to route the trac towards the nodes under
their control [56, 129, 141]. Recent studies have shown that similar
aacks are also possible in LTE networks using Diameter-based
aack vectors [78, 79].
Data (Internet trac) interception aacks work dier from
call and SMS interception. An adversary can intercept or mod-
ify the content by stripping o the encryption on the radio link
layer or injecting messages via signaling protocols (GTP in this
case). However, it will be limited only to avail free internet at
the cost of someone else using redirection techniques. To tam-
per with the actual content of Internet trac, adversaries need a
more sophisticated approach, especially for modern LTE networks,
which overcomes many security issues of previous generations.
Here, we focus mainly on data interception in LTE networks from
man-in-the-middle adversaries.
As a reminder, mobile communication comprises user plane,
which contains the actual content (e.g., websites visited), and con-
trol plane, which involves radio and signaling control messages
on how the user trac should be communicated in the network.
e control plane in LTE radio transmission is both encrypted
and integrity protected, which forbids an adversary from control-
ling how the user trac should be transmied. However, the user
plane has only encryption, and this leads to various issues. Firstly,
this setup allows passive website ngerprinting from browsing
metadata, where a radio link aacker can learn a user’s accessed
website [102] or perform chosen plain-text aacks on the encrypted
user plane trac [152]. Secondly, adversaries can impersonate the
victim towards network due to network misconguration and im-
plementation errors [44]. Such errors, e.g., force the UE to accept
null encryption, which result in unencrypted user plane trac to
be intercepted by passive adversaries [151]. Similarly, fuzzing of
exception handling has shown that UE can be tricked to communi-
cate unprotected user data through an adversary-controlled rogue
LTE radio networks [99]. Finally, DNS trac remains alterable in
LTE RAN, which allows the adversary to perform DNS spoong
and data redirection aacks to intercept the user trac in unen-
crypted format [152]. Most of these data interception aacks work
mostly under controlled lab setup, and they are not observed in
the wild. In most of the cases, we believe that application-layer
security (HTTPs) oers protection to user’s internet trac.
Billing frauds refer to various types of aacks where an adver-
sary causes nancial discrepancies for operators. We suggest the
readers to refer to the work by Sahin et al. [154] for an extensive
overview and classication of billing frauds. In most cases, the
adversary’s objective is to avail services oered by operators for
free of charge. e rst kind of billing fraud includes voice calls
and SMS. Adversaries can generate spoofed and spam SMS and
calls, e.g., by signaling trac manipulation [56, 129] and fake base
stations [8]. Similarly, the Internet-based services for calls and
SMS (including SIP, VoIP and VoLTE) have no means to restrict or
verify the authenticity of the origin of the communication, which
results in a wide range of billing frauds [42, 46, 98, 114, 175, 187].
e second kind of billing fraud includes mobile Internet services.
Adversaries here (which also includes mobile users) alter the mobile
Internet trac, e.g., by spoong mobile IP headers [136, 180] or by
manipulating TCP and DNS requests [68, 69] and cause nancial
discrepancies in an operator’s accounting of data usage.
We segregate the denial of service aacks into two categories.
e rst one is the Denial of Service (DoS) – Network aacks
which relies on creating signaling havoc in specic nodes of op-
erators by repeatedly triggering resource allocation or revocation
requests. Such aacks are capable of exhausting powerful core
network nodes such as the HLR. Most of the signaling DoS aacks
are targeted towards exhausting the the RAN by abusing radio
channel allocation requests [29, 30, 71, 94, 110, 146]. Another major
category of DoS aacks arise from SMS-capable interfaces from
IMS domain and from public Internet where operators have least
control [48, 54, 173, 175]. Similarly, cellular botnets [97, 174] (in-
cluding SMS-botnets [67, 185]) can launch DoS aacks from a large
army of compromised UEs.
e second category is of Denial of Service – User aacks.
Although they share commonalities with the DoS – Network tech-
niques, they are targeted towards denying service to mobile users.
e most popular DoS aacks on users are in the form of radio
signal jamming [26, 91, 117, 118, 183]. Radio link adversaries use
open-source tools for building such jammers and forbid users from
joining mobile networks [142]. Such DoS aacks on the radio inter-
face are oen seen in conjunction with other types of interception
and location tracking aacks [162]. Another type of DoS – User at-
tack emerges from core network adversaries who can alter SS7 and
Diameter protocol messages [56, 104]. Unlike jamming, the adver-
sary here modies subscription prole data of targeted mobile users
while sending location update requests in inter-operator roaming
scenarios. More specically, the adversary deletes or changes loca-
tion information of a roaming user in the subscription prole and
convinces the serving network to deny services, such as calls or
SMS to victim users.
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Identity-based attacks involve aack techniques using user-
and network-specic identiers (refer to section 7.1). Identity-based
aacks cause harm to the privacy of mobile users and produce
fraudulent trac that incurs a nancial loss to operators. In most
cases, identity-based aacks are used in impersonation, where an
adversary impersonates a legitimate mobile user to the core network
without possessing appropriate credentials, for example, to avail
free mobile services [83, 153]. Most of the signaling aacks that
use SS7 are also fall into this category. In other cases, identity-
based aacks involve identity mapping, where the adversaries map
temporary identiers (e.g., TMSI and GUTI) to permanent identiers
(e.g., IMSI or MSISDN) [23, 81, 150, 184]. In rare cases, the IMSI can
further be mapped to social media identities [162].
8 USE CASES OF THE THREAT MODEL
In this section, we present two use cases of the Bhadra threat
modeling framework with the help of concrete examples. More
specically, we demonstrate how to use Bhadra for modeling in-
dividual aacks independently and for modeling and comparing
multiple aacks all together.
8.1 Modeling individual attacks
As exemplars of recent aacks, we consider Simjacker [16] and
MESSAGETAP [111] for our case studies. We chose them because
neither of them has been studied in any of the literature that we con-
sidered for building our threat model. As the recently discovered
aacks, they both give us fresh perspectives on the sophistication
and evolution of adversarial tactics and techniques of state-of-the-
art aacks on mobile communication systems. ese aacks are
believed to be conducted by sophisticated aacker groups. e
existence of adversary groups allows us to look at the adversarial
behavior through the lens of our framework. Furthermore, given
that these aacks span over most of the tactical categories and mul-
tiple techniques in each tactic, they are ideal for us to show the use
case of our framework to model individual aacks independently.
8.1.1 Case study 1: Simjacker .
Simjacker was publicly disclosed in September 2019 by Adaptive-
Mobile Security during their lookout for identifying unexpected
behavior and previously undetected suspicious activity in mobile
communication networks [17]. Simjacker is a large scale espionage
aack on mobile users in multiple countries, presumably from a
competent adversary group on behalf of a nation-state actor. In its
entirety, the adversary here exploits vulnerabilities in SIM cards
with SIM alliance Toolkit (S@T) browser to execute SIM-specic
functionalities without the knowledge of the targeted mobile user.
e adversary sends the aack payload in the form of a specially
formaed binary SMS to the victim’s phone, either through a reg-
ular UE, VAS provider, or SS7 protocol. A successful aack yields
the location and IMEI of the user to the adversary as a reply SMS
without the notice of the mobile user.
S@T browser specications were developed by the SIM Al-
liance [19]. It allows running applications in the SIM card using
commands from over the air (OTA) SMS. Unlike the regular SMS for
sending text messages between mobile users, OTA SMS is a special
form of binary SMS that issues commands to be executed on the
SIM card as per 3GPP TS 31.111 [13]. Typically, such binary SMS
are sent from mobile operators to their subscribers to congure
the SIM Card to initiate various value-added services. Since such
commands are expected only from legitimate network operators,
authentication to execute the commands is not implemented. Com-
mands that are specic to S@T browser can, e.g., power o the SIM
card, collect UE-specic information (such as the location, IMEI,
and baery status) and send them back via mobile services (i.e.,
SMS, MMS, USSD), launch a web browser or make phone calls.
We now model the Simjacker aack with the Bhadra framework
(refer to Figure 4a) and explain the aack procedures in detail.
Initial access — Although the aack originates elsewhere, the rst
point of access for the adversary is the SIM cards with S@T browser
functionalities. erefore, we tag the “SIM-based aacks” technique
for the initial access tactical category.
Persistence — e S@T browser is embedded to the SIM card, and
its functionalities are hard-coded. So, the adversary can exploit
the vulnerabilities as long as the SIM card is replaced with one
without the S@T browser. erefore, we tag the “infecting SIM
cards” technique for the persistence tactical category.
Discovery — To know the presence of the S@T browser, the ad-
versary has two potential options. Firstly, by sending test messages
to the target UE (i.e.“UE knocking” technique). Secondly, from “in-
ternal resource search”, where the mobile operators or their card
manufacturers may have the list of SIM cards issued with S@T
browsers.
Lateral movement — e initial target of the adversary was Mex-
ican mobile subscribers; however, eventually, Colombian and Pe-
ruvian subscribers also became prey. Also, the analysis reveals
the reliance on SS7-based aack vectors [16]. Based on these, we
assume that the adversary uses the “exploit roaming agreements”
technique to move laterally from the original victim operator to its
partner operators.
Standard protocol misuse — As per the analysis of Simjacker
aack activities on a global scale, a close coordination of “SS7-based
aacks” were seen carrying the SMS payload [16]. Although most
of the aack SMS was originated from actual UEs, a signicant
fraction was also originated from SS7 addresses (i.e., from GTs of
other mobile operators) if the UE-originated SMS were not delivered
to the victim mobile subscriber.
Defense evasion — Exploiting binary SMS is not novel by it-
self. Such aacks are demonstrated in information security con-
ferences [18, 128] and also used in the wild by nation-state ac-
tors [86, 121]. Due to these disclosures, operators have implemented
blocking on the ability of SIM card to process binary SMS, as per
3GPP TS 23.048 [10]. However, the Simjacker aack circumvents
any such defense on the UE side with sophisticated SMS packet
encoding. It is observed that modication of SMS headers, non-
standard binary SMS formats, and multi-parted packet creations
are used while encoding the SMS packets to route and processed
by SIM cards. Hence, we tag ”UE protection evasion” as one of the
defense evasion techniques.
For evading defense during network traversal of protocol mes-
sages carrying the SMS payload, the adversary uses the “bypass
rewall” technique. More specically, for the SS7-based variants,
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Figure 4: Modeling recent attacks using Bhadra framework (only relevant techniques are shown)
the adversary impersonates (by using valid GTs) the MSC/MME and
SMS center (SMSC) from the targeted operator’s partners. Similarly,
the payload was also sent from valid VAS providers directly to the
SMSC of the targeted operator. In both cases, the impersonation
of trusted sources helps the adversary to avoid ltering by re-
wall rules and to transport the payload in and out of the targeted
operator’s network.
Collection — e adversary’s binary SMS instructs the SIM card
on the target UE to collect its current serving cell-ID (“user-specic
data”) and IMEI of the UE (“user-specic identier”). is collected
information will be sent back to the adversary, also, in the form of
a binary SMS.
Impact — Although aacks that exploit the S@T browser can
perform various dangerous functionalities, Simjacker aacks have
targeted primarily only on large scale collection of cell-ID and IMEI
of UEs. We therefore tag “location tracking” and “identity-based
aacks” respectively for the adversary’s impact techniques.
8.1.2 Case study 2: MessageTap.
MESSAGETAP was publicly disclosed in October 2019 by the Fire-
Eye threat research team during their investigation of a network
provider [111]. Based on the evidence, it is aributed to APT41
Chinese APT group [61] in support of state-sponsored espionage
campaign by the Chinese government. MESSAGETAP is a malware
that sits on the SMSC servers of the operators and logs SMS content
and contact network of specic individuals (based on their IMSIs
and phone numbers) that are of geopolitical interest for the Chi-
nese intelligence. SMSC is a Linux server that is mainly responsible
for routing SMS messages to intended mobile subscribers. How-
ever, if the recipients are not online (i.e., not aached to the mobile
network), SMSC stores the SMS for them until the subscriber is
available to deliver.
MESSAGETAP is a Linux Executable and Linkable Format (ELF)
malware specially craed for SMSC, and its working mechanism is
as follows. MESSAGETAP initiated on the SMSC by an installation
script. e script also involves two data les, one with target IMSIs
and phone numbers and the other with a list of keywords to match.
Both these les are erased from disk once they read and loaded
into memory. MESSAGETAP then starts to monitor all network
connections to and from the SMSC, parsing, and extracting the
SMS data from the network trac based on the content of data
les loaded into memory. More specically, the malware looks for
specic IMSIs, phone numbers, and keywords from the data les
in the SMS message ow. If a match is found, the IMSI, source and
destination phone numbers, and content of the SMS message are
stored in separate les to be sent to the adversary.
We now model this aack with the Bhadra framework (refer to
Figure 4b) and explain the procedures in detail.
Initial access — SMSc is an operator-specic entity, and installing
a malicious script on it is unlikely done by arbitrary adversaries.
Although there are no clear evidence of how the script was installed
on the SMSC, given the involvement of nation-state actors, we
speculate that it is deliberately done by insiders from the mobile
operators. We, therefore, tag the “insider aacks and human errors”
technique for the initial access tactic.
Persistence — In terms of persistence, the adversary’s technique
falls into the category of “infecting network nodes”. Once the mal-
ware is installed on the SMSC, the adversary’s control over it per-
sists as long as the malware is not removed or at least its function-
alities are restricted.
Discovery — We tag “internal resource search” for the adversary’s
discovery technique for discovering the details of SMSC and the
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possibilities of installing a script for logging SMS messages. Al-
though there is no clear evidence on how the adversary discovered
it, we suspect the involvement of insiders leaking internal resources
about such details.
Lateral movement — e malware installation probably exploits
improper access control or authorization on the SMSC server. While
we do not know the exact reason, like any malware, in general, we
believe that the MESSAGETAP uses the “exploit platform and service-
specic vulnerabilities” technique for lateral movement. Since ev-
erything occurs on the SMSC, there is only a slight dierence in
lateral movement tactic from the initial access. e laer refers to
an insider having bare minimal access to the SMSC server, whereas
the former involved leveraging such access to install malware.
Standard protocol misuse — Even though SMS communication
is part of the standard protocol (SS7 in this case), the protocol itself
has no role in the aack execution. So, we leave the “Standard
protocol misuse” blank in our model.
Defense evasion — As mentioned before, aer the installation, the
malware starts capturing the network trac and parses all layers
of the protocol. is action typically requires elevated access rights
on the network interface or causes discrepancies (e.g., delay) in
the trac. e victim operator detected neither the installation
nor the network interception during their routine security audits.
Hence, we tag the “security audit camouage” as the defense evasion
technique.
Collection — e MESSAGETAP collects the content of the SMS
message based on a match with pre-dened keywords, IMSIs and
phone numbers contained in the SMS communication of specic
individuals. Hence, we tag “user-specic data” and “user-specic
identiers” respectively as the collection techniques.
Impact — e main objective of the adversary here is to log the
contents of the SMS. So, we rst tag the SMS interception technique
for the impact tactics. Secondly, the malware also builds a contact
network of specic individuals by collecting IMSIs and phone num-
bers associated with the SMS communication. We therefore tag
identity-based aacks also as an impact.
8.2 Comparing multiple attacks
For the comparison, we pick three aacks from the literature that
result in billing fraud. e only commonality between these aacks
is the adversary’s objective to use data services of an operator for
free of cost or at the expense of others. To do so, the adversary
obtains an IP address on behalf of a legitimate mobile user and tricks
the charging system into charging the victim subscriber (or the
operator in some cases) for all trac used by the adversary. All three
cases will incur direct nancial losses and accounting discrepancies
to the mobile operator. We do not go through individual tactics
one by one, as we did in the previous section. Instead, we briey
describe all three aacks and fast-forward to model and compare
them. e result is presented in Figure 5.
Attack 1 — e rst billing aack we consider is presented by
Peng et al.[135] in the form of two types of frauds, namely, toll-free
data service and stealth spam aacks. Even though both allow the
adversary to enjoy mobile data services at the expense of someone
else, we consider only the former aack. In the toll-free data service
aack, the adversary is a mobile subscriber who is capable of cra-
ing malicious data packets from the UE. e aack is based on the
observation that mobile operators transport DNS trac without
charging or limiting its usage. So, the adversary has two options
to exploit this. e rst one is to redirect TCP or UDP trac from
DNS port number 53, as many operators do not restrict the trac
from port 53, which is expected to send only DNS trac. However,
if non-DNS trac from port 53 is restricted, the adversary can
use the second option of redirecting using fake DNS requests. e
actual data resides inside the malformed DNS request, and it goes
undetected by the operator. In any case, the adversary will be able
to enjoy free data services.
Attack 2 — e second billing fraud aack that we consider is pre-
sented by Chlosta et al. [44]. e adversary here is a radio access
aacker who lures mobile subscribers in his vicinity to connect
to its spoofed radio access. e adversary acts as a man-in-the-
middle between a benign UE and the eNodeB to impersonate the
UE to the operator network and vice versa. As per LTE specica-
tions, mutual authentication between UE and eNodeB is ensured
with AKA protocol and the subsequent integrity protection of the
control plane. However, operator-specic implementations oen
fall back to insecure scenarios, such as allowing null-integrity and
null-encryption. e adversary collects the IMSI from the UE and
enforces the selection of null algorithms by the benign network us-
ing the downgrading technique. He then impersonates the benign
UE to the operator to obtain an IP. All following data services are
billed towards the victim as the Internet connections are associated
with its IMSI. In summary, the adversary obtains IMSI of the victim
and free Internet usage that is billed towards the victim as well.
Attack 3 – e nal aack that we consider is presented by Positive
Technologies [137]. e adversary here could be a human insider
with core network access. e adversary exploits the fact that IP
addresses of the UE that sends a request to the operator’s core net-
work entities (for data service access purposes) are not thoroughly
veried, especially if they come as part of a core network proto-
col message. e adversary has to spoof the subscribers identity
(IMSI) and uses GTP-based techniques to send “Create Session
Request”, a GTP control plane service message to the PGW (refer
Figure 1) to gain Internet access at the cost of someone else. If the
spoofed IMSI belongs to a legitimate subscriber, the charging sys-
tem of the partner operator will charge that subscriber for all trac
used by the adversary. If the IMSI is bogus, the partner operator will
have to bear the cost of data services used by the adversary. Unlike
aacks 1 and 2, even though the aacker is an insider, he has to per-
form additional steps to gure out the correct address of the PGW
of the partner operator through CN-specic scanning, exploiting
inter-operator roaming agreements and bypassing rewalls that
forbid from sending malicious GTP trac.
As we can see in Figure 5, Bhadra framework is used for compar-
ing multiple aacks where the main objective of the adversary is to
enjoy data services for free, which in turn results in billing frauds.
ough we followed the same steps for modeling individual aacks
as we did in Section 8.1, we color-coded them so that common tech-
niques between the aacks can be highlighted with an overlapping
color. Although the objective is the same in all three aacks, as we
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Figure 5: Comparing billing fraud attacks using Bhadra framework (only relevant techniques are shown)
can see from modeling comparison, the adversarial paths to achieve
them diers extensively from each other. Of course, the adversarial
paths depend very much on the adversary’s capabilities rather than
the objective itself. One might assume that for a human insider
(aack 3), it is much easier to conduct billing frauds. However,
on the contrary, such adversaries have to perform the additional
steps of discovery, and lateral movement techniques, which the
adversary closer to user endpoints (from aack 1 and 2) can skip.
On the other hand, aack 1 and 2 involve building custom aack
tools to tinker with radio hardware or mobile application-level pro-
gramming, which requires more technical knowledge, unlike using
operational network functionalities that the human insider can use
in aack 3. is way, we believe that the additional steps taken by
aacker 3 compensate in terms of the diculty of the aack.
While what we have compared and discussed is just an example,
one could infer various other things by comparing aacks that have
more commonalities. One specic thing that is more interesting
in all cases is how the adversarial paths, which depicts the behav-
ioral aspects of the aacks, dier from each other despite their
commonalities.
9 DISCUSSION
Initial generations of mobile communications are neither based
on strong cryptographic primitives nor built with modern security
needs. Instead, it started from forbidding access to gradual additions
of security features to various non-operators as the need for vari-
ous kinds of services expanded. Lack of stronger security building
blocks in the initial generations have bothered till the current ones.
5G seems to end this trend by starting everything from scratch. For
example, there are proposals for the use of public-key infrastruc-
ture [85] or formal verication of the protocols [35, 47, 84], all of
these which have not been done before. We believe that our frame-
work ts into this growing trend of learning from past mistakes
and trying out methods that are not previously practiced.
At this point, we believe that our framework is just the rst iter-
ation, as this is the rst of its kind. It can grow mature in the future
with more contributions from the mobile security community. e
modular nature of the framework makes it easier to add more tech-
niques to existing tactical categories or even add additional tactics
if there are a sucient number of techniques, that too, without
disturbing the rest of the framework.
Furthermore, the matrix representation of the framework makes
it an excellent candidate to be used for quantitative analytic pur-
poses. More specically, by modeling individual aacks and deduc-
ing statistics about each technique will indicate a lack of security
in certain areas. is could, for example, be used for focusing more
on techniques that are more frequently used than others. We be-
lieve that using the framework for such purposes would benet the
holistic security of mobile communication systems. Similarly, the
framework can also be used as a vulnerability impact measurement
metrics by adding other dimensions. For instance, techniques in
each tactical categories can be arranged according to the complex-
ity or severity of the impact of the techniques. Such newly added
dimensions give newer insights when modeling aacks by a spe-
cic adversary group and comparing its overall impact with other
groups. In these cases, color-coding them further — e.g., lighter
shades for less severe aacks and darker for the most severe ones
— could also be useful.
As of now, our framework serves as a single point of technical
reference for various adversarial techniques used in mobile com-
munication systems. e future directions in which such technical
references can ourish include, for example, adding more back-
ground and subcategories of the techniques, open-source forensic
tools and test suites to detect or defend against the techniques and
general best practices and mitigation examples. Tools could also
be developed for annotation of the Bhadra matrix and to use such
annotation data for deducing further analytics. Similar tools exist
for MITRE ATT&CK framework, which is used regularly by secu-
rity teams in enterprise networks [3, 6], and we continue to seek
inspiration to bring them into the mobile communication sector.
To make such developments feasible for the security community,
we consider our future contributions to focus on building a reposi-
tory of aacks modeled with Bhadra and application programming
interfaces to access them. Nonetheless, it can only be possible with
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the help of the community contributions, and we believe that our
work initiates such a conversation in the community.
Limitations. One of the main limitations of our work is that we
deduced the techniques in each tactical categories based on their
commonalities across underlying technologies and network subsys-
tems. For instance, “downgrading” is a defense evasion technique
that is seen in all generations of mobile technology and seen across
radio access, core network, and other subsystems. Our method-
ology is skewed towards such generalization and abstraction of
common aacks rather than the aacks that are exclusive to one
specic subsystem or technology. Although such generalization is
needed to make our framework agnostic to all kinds of aacks, we
might have missed the exclusive ones.
Another limitation of our work is that it is built on the existing
aack literature that is publicly available, and it does not include
anything that is observed in the wild by mobile operators, which is
used exclusively for internal purposes. e former mainly includes
aacks that involve UE and radio access network with explicit
details from academia, and some of the core network vulnerabilities
published as excerpts mostly by the mobile security auditors. ere
is minimal public information, e.g., for aacks on OSS networks,
which we could not t in our framework. Nonetheless, as and
when such information is publicly available, it can be added to
our framework. In fact, we encourage entities involved in mobile
communication to open up datasets about vulnerabilities observed
in the wild for the public good.
10 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a threat modeling framework that is spe-
cic to mobile communication systems. Our framework comprises
various tactics and techniques that represent an adversary’s objec-
tives throughout the life cycle of an aack. We described two use
cases of the framework, namely, for modeling individual aacks and
for comparing aacks that share some commonalities. We hereby
hope that our work unies prior knowledge and initiates a con-
versation towards future eorts to secure mobile communication
networks.
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